Refugee Returns as Political Symbolism? Unpacking the Consequences of Syria’s Readmission into the Arab League
Flag of the League of Arab States; Source: Wikimedia Commons
by: Judith Hoppermann | University of Glasgow
In May 2023, the League of Arab States (heretofore the Arab League) – a regional, intergovernmental organisation – readmitted Syria after 12 years of absence, signalling a return to a political ‘business as usual’ approach towards the country. Through that, member states hope to reach an Arab solution to the refugee crisis and pursue various strategies related to refugee returns. This post unpacks how these strategies affect refugee politics on the ground. Depending on the outcomes of negotiations between Syria and the Arab League, these could range from political symbolism and fewer implications for refugees to expedited repatriation because of geopolitical strategies.
In May 2023, the Arab League allowed Syria to attend a summit for the first time since 2011. There, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad announced: “I hope that [Syria’s return to the Arab League …] marks the beginning of a new phase of Arab action for solidarity among us, for peace in our region, development and prosperity instead of war and destruction” (Al Jazeera 2023, Guardian 2023). At a joint press conference with the League’s Secretary General post-summit, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, in his role as the summit’s host, announced, “We are all concerned that Syrian refugees can return safely to their homes. We will work with the government in Damascus to make this possible” (Arabi 21 2023, author’s translation). Read together with a statement of the Secretary General calling for a rapid resolution of the crisis (The National 2023), the quotes highlight two issues: First, Syria’s readmittance to the League is closely tied to achieving other goals: According to news reports, pre-summit conversations centred around the return of refugees, curbing narcotics smuggling and restoring state authority in Syria (Atlantic Council 2023, Reuters 2023) or, in other words, regional stability in terms of politics and economics. Second, the nature and importance of these goals can differ by member state. Taking these observations a step further, this blog post asks: What are the driving strategies for such a diverse group of actors, such as the Arab League (with twenty-two member states), to readmit Syria? And how do the states’ strategies linked to refugee returns affect outcomes for refugees in practice?
An Arab Solution to the Syrian Crisis
Syria’s readmittance was preceded by a gradual political opening of the Arab world, starting with Arab states such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain cautiously restoring relations with the Assad regime from 2018 onwards. Although other states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, rejected its return in the past, they, too, changed their position. When Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan took office in 2019, he declared that “the absence of an Arab role in the Syrian crisis has harmed Arab interests and left Syria’s fate to be decided by non-Arab countries” (Al Jazeera 2023, author’s translation). Then, the earthquake in February 2023 and subsequent regional aid in northern Syria brought the Arab League member states and Syria closer together. Now, the League’s plan to fully restore relations is a gradual, systematic, “step-by-step” approach that follows UN resolutions (Al-Hurra 2023) while still allowing each member to decide their policy towards Damascus (Reuters 2023).
Meeting room of the League of Arab States. Source: flickr.com
Divergent Strategies Linked to Refugee Returns
To understand actors’ motivations in driving refugee returns, recent political developments can be linked to existing academic research, which indicates that it is possible to distinguish three strategies related to the return of refugees to Syria. Understanding their difference allows us to contextualise the Arab League’s efforts as its members’ different approaches – as refugee hosting countries, refugee country of origin and third parties – might lead to different possible outcomes for refugees on the ground.
1. Symbolic Strategies
For Syria, readmission to the Arab League, and especially the return of refugees to its territory, is most importantly aiming at political symbolism: a symbol for return to normality which supports the legitimacy of the Assad regime (Camarena 2022, 2-3; Joireman 2022, 9). Building on this symbolism, returns could enable additional demands, such as ending sanctions by Western countries on Syria (Euractiv 2023).
2. Material & Pragmatic Strategies
As for host countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, their strategies are driven by material and pragmatic interests: pragmatically, they pursue the physical return of refugees in general and respond to domestic pressures and costs imposed by hosting refugees (Camarena, 2022). However, they can also explicitly pursue material goals, for example, when threatening with refugee returns to extract rents (Freier et al 2021).
3. Geopolitical Strategies
For states not primarily involved in sending or hosting Syrian refugees, such as Arab League member states like Saudi Arabia, refugee returns signal – like for most of the international community – a partial resolution to the conflict. From their point of view, returns can be seen as a means to an end, specifically to reach regional stability and the economic and political advantages that come with it. Yet, it seems like actors who pursue this approach neglect that returns are not a “one way ticket” (Arar & Fitzgerald 2023, 205), with refugees possibly returning only for a short period, splitting time between the host country and country of origin, or being forced to flee again (Ibid., Norman 2021, 180).
How Does Syria’s Readmittance to the Arab League Affect Refugee Returns?
Ahead of the League’s May 2023 summit, a statement by several NGOs confirmed the link between state strategies around normalising relations with Syria and outcomes for refugees on the ground. In their statement, the NGOs warned that this development could put refugees at risk of coerced and expedited returns (Refugees International 2023). Thus far, any initial optimism for a swift agreement enabling refugee returns is dampened: after a lack of progress in negotiations, the Arab League reportedly froze meetings of its liaison committee in mid-September (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2023), a month after its first meeting in Cairo (CNN Arabic 2023). The committee had been established to continue the dialogue between the Arab states and Syria to find a political solution to the conflict, including refugees’ return to Syria (Muasher, 2023). If, however, the Assad regime and the Arab League return to the negotiating table, pressure to return will likely increase, reportedly prompting fear around refugee populations (Atlantic Council 2023).
Critical in determining outcomes on returns are the three strategies – (1) symbolic, (2) pragmatic & material as well as (3) geopolitical – the negotiating states are pursuing – with the possibility of coerced return rising from a symbolic to a geopolitical approach. Thus, outcomes of Syria’s return to the Arab League can play out differently, depending on future developments:
1. Outcomes of Syria’s Symbolism Strategy
With refugee returns being only a symbol of regime legitimacy, this strategy will have limited impacts on population movements for the time being. Continuing ongoing returns, while framing them differently, will be sufficient to reach regime legitimacy. However, the strategy is likely to cause fear about forced returns among Syrian refugee populations in neighbouring host countries.
2. Outcomes of Host Countries’ Material & Pragmatic Strategy
Hosting states pursuing a material strategy have the potential to upscale coerced returns to Syria by using the declaration to justify their ongoing operations. Indeed, its readmittance to the Arab League and further agreements in the future could then open alternative pathways of legitimising returns, effectively allowing the states to bypass other actors who are currently not condoning returns officially, such as the European Union or the United Nations.
3. Outcomes of Third States’ Geopolitical Strategy
Strategies seeking to restore regional stability will likely have the largest effect on refugee returns. They could even significantly expedite ongoing small-scale returns through regional cooperation and diplomatic efforts. This restoration would mean finding an “Arab solution” – as the Lebanese Foreign Ministry puts it – to the Syria Crisis as initially envisioned by the Arab League (L’Orient 2023). The prerequisite for this would be that meetings of the liaison committee continue or that Arab League member states who favour this solution engage in a leading role in brokering an agreement.
As regional politics are recalibrated, future outcomes of negotiations between Syria and the Arab League will determine new ways of understanding how refugees are instrumentalized in domestic, bilateral, and regional politics in the Middle East. These outcomes will further our understanding of how states’ strategies in instrumentalizing refugees can affect refugee returns and how intersecting strategies for returns can enable each other. As such, some strategies primarily focusing on the political symbolism of returns will drive refugee returns less drastically than geopolitical strategies. However, political symbolism helping to strengthen the Syrian regime’s legitimacy could build the foundation for third states’ broader geopolitical goals in the region. The latter may lead to joint efforts to expedite returns by attempting to create regional stability and ending a conflict by returning a refugee population and thus restoring the status quo.
Sources:
Arar, R. and FitzGerald, D. (2023) The Refugee System: A Sociological Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Camarena, K. R. (2022) Repatriation During Conflict: A Signaling Analysis. World Development, 158, 1–14.
Freier, L.; Micinski, N. and Tsourapas, G. (2021). Refugee Commodification: the Diffusion of Refugee-Rent Seeking in the Global South. Third World Quarterly, 42(11), 2747–2748.
Norman, K. P. (2021) Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration, and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contact:
Judith Hoppermann | University of Glasgow, UK | 2834994h@student.gla.ac.uk